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A gangland-style multiple slaying in a restaurant. An economy propped up with narco-dollars. Assassinations of 
drug dealers, journalists and DEA informants. Drug scandals at the highest levels of the military. Judges 
inexplicably dropping charges against major kingpins. 
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It may sound like Colombia, circa 1990, but these are headlines from the last month in Mexico, and to many they 
suggest a country reeling under the weight of drug warfare and corruption. Analysts expect the problems will only 
get worse as Mexico tries to shake itself from the grip of powerful drug mafias that have deeply penetrated the 
country's institutions and are unlikely to let go without a bloody, violent fight. 
John Anderson, “Mexican Drug Crisis Echoes Bloody Colombian Pattern,” Washington Post  8/11/97 
 
Gone are the days when Mexico’s drug war was an abstraction for most people, something they lamented over the 
morning papers as if it were unfolding far away. Reminders are everywhere, like the radios blasting drug ballads 
that romanticize the criminals and the giant banners that drug cartels hang from overpasses to recruit killers and 
threaten rivals. 
Marc Lacey, “Drug Violence Alters the Flow of Life in Mexico,” New York Times  8/30/08 
 
It is a time of extraordinary violence all over Mexico. Feuding drug-trafficking groups and the federal government's 
military crackdown against organized crime have left 5,376 dead this year. 
Ken Ellingwood, “Extreme Drug Violence Grips Mexico Border City,” Los Angeles Times  12/19/08 
 
Introduction:  The Colombianization of Mexico 
 
The news from Mexico is grim.  Drug-related violence has climbed every year of the Calderon 
Administration:  at least 8150 people have been killed since he took office.  No one is safe; 
Mexico’s chief of police and the head of the federal police’s organized crime division were both 
assassinated.  Decapitated heads are thrown into discos, young children killed as bystanders.  
The violence is appalling and escalating. 
For many, this suggests that Mexico is heading down the path charted by Colombia.  Observers 
worry that Mexico is experiencing “Colombianization.”  Does the future of Mexico include such 
things as a burning Supreme Court building, bombs detonated in major financial institutions, and 
large swathes of land outside the control of the state and under the control of revolutionary 
forces?     
Despite the news coming from Mexico, I would argue that Mexico is not undergoing 
“Colombianization”.  There are critical aspects of the situations in both Colombia and Mexico 
that differentiate the two countries.  The need to distinguish between conditions in Colombia and 
Mexico is crucial.  Public policy is shaped by analogies.  If policy makers think the Mexico is 
undergoing “Colombianization,” then there will be a tendency to apply the same policies to 
Mexico (a tendency already manifest with the Merida Imitative).    Furthermore, poorly 
understood situations give rise to poorly planned policies that are unlikely to achieve their 
objectives.  Since Mexico differs from Colombia, a “Colombian” solution is unlikely to work.  In 
the material offered below, I hope to correct this misunderstanding by identifying significant 
dissimilarities between Colombia and Mexico.  My goal is to accentuate the differences between 
the two countries that refute the “Colombianization” hypothesis.  I conclude the paper with an 
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assessment of policies that have been pursued in Colombia and suggested for Mexico; the 
prognosis for the future is not good. 
It is clear that drug trafficking generates violence and threatens state institutions.  Decades of 
drug war policies that emphasize eradication, extradition, interdiction, and prohibition have not 
ended drug use in the United States.  Research in the field suggests that supply side approaches 
fundamentally fail to resolve the problem.  By targeting supply rather than demand, the illicit 
activity shifts location rather than stops.  This is commonly referred to as the “balloon effect.”  
Likewise, the law enforcement, supply side approach is associated with increased violence as 
drug networks are disrupted.  Thus, if the US and Mexico pursue the same policy as undertaken 
in Colombia, Mexico might well see increased violence.  Furthermore, past experience suggests 
that drug traffickers will modify their operations rather than cease to traffic. 
 
Key Terms and Concepts 
 
The term “Colombianization” is often used to signify widespread drug violence.  This is 
typically the implication when utilized with reference to Mexico.  For example, 
For years, people both inside and outside Mexico have 
worried that the country might descend into the maelstrom 
of corruption and violence that has long plagued the chief 
drug-source country in the Western Hemisphere, Colombia. 
There are growing signs that the “Colombianization” of 
Mexico is now becoming a reality. (Carpenter, 2005) 
A quick review of the term indicates that it has been applied to many different countries in 
addition to Mexico (such as Guatemala, Brazil).  I am not challenging its potential applicability 
to other countries.  However, I would like to specify more precisely all of the elements implied 
by “Colombianization.”  At a minimum “Colombianization” refers to “the disintegration of 
institutions-political, economic and social - and a permanent state of violent crime”. (Jordan, 
1999:  166) 
The rise of drug violence in Colombia was accompanied by the loss of state control within the 
borders of Colombia.  Several non-state actors were strengthened; their power and prominence 
was financed by drug proceeds (see Jordan, 1999, esp. Chapter 9).  While these various actors 
played a role in drug production and trafficking, a number of them had other political and 
economic objectives.  Drugs provided a means to another end.  Violence was only part of the 
process:  the broad based breakdown of various institutions was another key aspect.  Thus, the 
term “Colombianization” suggests that the state faces challenges to its basic functioning and its 
ability to govern.  More than just gruesome violence and corruption, “Colombianization” 
connotes the beginnings of a failed state. 
By utilizing the term “Colombianization” observers are implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) 
making an analogy between Colombia and Mexico.  Analogies play an important role in policy 
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development (see, for example, Khong, 1992).  Of particular interest for me is the role that 
analogies play in framing an issue.  While policy frames perform several functions, two are of 
special importance.  First, frames suggest successful and unsuccessful strategies.  Furthermore, 
frames shape public (and policy makers’) opinion about situation and policies.  As research in 
prospect theory demonstrates, frames determine the degree of risk acceptance (see, among 
others, Berejekian, 1997; Boettcher III, 2004; and, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991).  Risk 
aversion and risk acceptance is not constant; rather, people view risk differently depending upon 
whether or not they perceive the situation to be one of  gain or  loss.  Frames are one method of 
establishing the “gain/loss” domain.  A policy framed as successful (even mildly so) places it in 
a gain domain; this is associated with risk aversion and thereby increases the likelihood of 
maintaining current policy.  In contrast, a frame that places policy in a loss domain opens to door 
to greater possibility of policy change, since loss domain is associated with risk acceptance.  
Thus, the framing Mexico has profound policy implications. 
 
Is Mexico Another Colombia? 
 
Should policy makers and analysts make an analogy between Mexico and Colombia?  Clearly 
there is a case to be made for “framing” the situation in this way.  The current situation in 
Mexico is reminiscent of Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s.  Mexican traffickers are targeting 
state officials; corruption is plaguing local, state, and federal government.  The homicide rate is 
rising fast; drug traffickers appear to act with impunity.  Compare the two following quotes: 
Machine gun- and grenade-toting …dispense personal 
justice as it strikes them, waging gang wars, and 
assassinating police and judicial officials who resist 
corruption, or simply innocent citizens unwilling to sell 
their land, boat, business, or house.  Thus lawlessness 
related to drug trafficking has a destabilizing effect on life 
… (Lupsha, 1981: 110) 
The gangland-style violence has left almost no corner … 
untouched. Drug-related slayings take place in houses, 
restaurants and bars, at playgrounds and children's parties, 
and in car-to-car ambushes. … [A]ll around are signs of 
social fraying. Menacing notes appear outside schools 
warning of harm unless teachers hand over their year-end 
bonuses. The city's most respected crime reporter, 
Armando Rodriguez, of the El Diario newspaper, is dead, 
sprayed by gunfire two weeks earlier as he sat in his car in 
front of his home. (Ellingwood, 2008) 
The situations certainly sound similar.  Indeed, one might not be able to identify which quote 
refers to what country.  The article from 1981 concerns Colombia; the second quote (from 2008) 
is about Mexico. From the perspective of these reports, Colombia and Mexico share unfortunate 
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similarities.  While almost thirty years separate the two quotes, the violence and destruction 
unleashed by the drug war has not changed.   
From a more long-term perspective, the circumstances in Mexico and Colombia today could be 
considered unexpected.  Ten years ago (1998-1999), the state of affairs appeared different.  At 
that time Colombia seemed to be on the brink of collapse.  The Colombian state was being 
marginalized; conflict between revolutionary forces and paramilitary forces dominated national 
security concerns.  The state did not control all of its territory; often it was not even a participant 
in violent, large scale military actions.   
In contrast, ten years ago Mexico seemed to be on an upward trajectory.  It was on the verge of 
solidifying its democratization with the election of an opposition candidate, Vicente Fox, to the 
presidency.  In terms of the drug war, the United States was confident that the end of PRI rule 
would signal a new era in US-Mexican relations.  Typically the United States government had 
considered PRI rule as corrupt and a fundamental contributor to the failing drug war. (Scherlen, 
2008)  Relations between the states had been strained by the annual certification process.  For 
part the 1990s Mexico had declined US counter narcotics assistance.  But the election of Fox was 
perceived to mark a major change:  State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Reports for 2002 and 2003 stated that “the United States and Mexico achieved unprecedented 
levels of cooperation in fighting drug trafficking”.  However, Fox Administration really marked 
a continuation of a deteriorating drug war.  By the end of Fox’s term,  
the United States … openly berated Mexico for failing to 
stop a wave of drug-related violence that has taken close to 
1,000 lives along the 2,000-mile border. The Bush 
administration … issued numerous travel advisories and 
temporarily closed its consulate in the city of Nuevo 
Laredo, which has turned into a murder capital as drug 
traffickers fight for control of lucrative routes into Texas. 
(Thompson, 2005) 
The election of the Calderon Administration in 2006 was cheered by the US government: 
experts on the drug trade [were] optimistic that [Calderon] 
[would] do better than Mr. Fox. They note that Mr. 
Calderon has adopted strategies that worked in Colombia 
in the 1990s: using the military to take back regions where 
drug dealers control the local authorities, extraditing top 
cartel members to the United States and eradicating crops 
of marijuana and poppies. (McKinley, 2007-emphasis 
added) 
Notice the policy analogy between Mexico and Colombia.  In this case, observers were 
expressing a positive connection:  successful policies in Colombia were to be implemented (and 
likewise be successful) in Mexico.   
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Of course, some might argue that the drug war has not been very successful waged in Colombia.  
While violence has declined from the levels experienced throughout the late eighties and the 
nineties, Colombia remains a main player in the international drug market.  According to the 
latest data from the World Drug Report, Colombia continues to account for a majority of global 
coca cultivation. 
When did the situation change?  When did Colombia become a (possible) model for success and 
Mexico a country on the brink of disaster?  Colombia clearly had higher levels of drug-related 
violence in the past; the latter years of the 2
nd
 Uribe Administration have been associated with 
declining kidnapping, killing, and improvements in the security situation.  Conversely, Mexico is 
now experiencing unprecedented levels of drug-related violence.  Does this mean that Mexico is 
undergoing “Colombianization” and therefore should look to the Uribe Administration for clues 
to remedy the situation? 
I would urge caution.  There are many differences between the two countries, several of which 
impact upon drug war policy.  First, each country has a distinct role in the international drug 
market.  Colombia is a both a producing country and transit country for heroin, cocaine, and 
(marginally) marijuana.  Mexico produces marijuana and heroin but serves solely as a 
transshipment point for cocaine.  Most of the drug war emphasis is on cocaine trafficking.  This 
influences the strategies that can be applied, as well as the responses available to traffickers.   
Another key element is geography.  As Porfirio Diaz noted – “Poor Mexico, so far from God, so 
close to the United States.”  Geography enables Colombia to successfully grow heroin, cocaine, 
and marijuana, as well as serve as a transit point for products traveling north.  Its rugged terrain 
make waging counterinsurgency difficult; it also offers amply opportunity for drug production 
and transit to go undetected.  Mexico’s key geographic characteristic is its border with the United 
States.  The proximity of Mexico to the US has led to a long history of illicit smuggling (both 
drugs and alcohol in the early years of the 20
th
 century).  The long and porous border makes 
Mexico a natural transit country for illegal goods destined for the US.  The difficulty with 
policing movement across the border has only increased with the growth of legal traffic between 
the US and Mexico. 
These elements noted above are important differences between Mexico and Colombia.  Yet they 
do not really identify why Mexico is not experiencing “Colombianization.”  There are three 
crucial aspects that distinguish the situation in Mexico from that of Colombia.  Each aspect in its 
own way refutes the “Colombianization” argument. 
 
Level and extent of violence 
A comparison of the two countries shows different degrees of violence as well as differences in 
its extensiveness.  The number of drug-related deaths in Colombia and Mexico are often 
compared.  For instance, in 2008 it is estimated that 5276 killings (ending December 2, 2008) 
took place in Mexico; however, Mexico’s overall homicide rate in 2007 was 11 deaths per 
100,000 people – a fraction of the rates in Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador and Brazil (Lacey, 
2008).  Due to its larger population, Mexico can have an overall number of murders comparative 
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with Colombia and still not experience the same level of violence.  The latest data from 
Colombia shows in 2007 a homicide rate of 37 deaths per 100,000 people.  This rate is over three 
times that of Mexico; at the same time, it represents as significant reduction in Colombian 
violence.  Twelve years ago, in 1997, it was 60 people per 100, 000 (Instituto Nacional de 
Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, 2008). 
Drug violence in Mexico occurs primarily in northern Mexico, near the border with the United 
States as well as traditional centers of production and trafficking, Sinaloa and Guerrero.  While 
some spectacular events have taken place in other states (eleven bodies found bloody heads 
rolled into a disco in Acapulco, Guerrero, for example), extensive drug-related violence has not 
spread to other states.  (See Map 1 for overview) 
 
Map 1:  Drug-related Killings in Mexico, Jan-Oct 2008 
Source:  Transborder Institute, University of San Diego 
 
In contrast, a map of drug-related violence in Colombia encompasses the entire country.  So 
many actors are engaged in violence that maps tend to distinguish between those with “high 
homicide rates” versus those closer to the national average.  (See Maps 2 and 3)  A review of the 
map indicates the pervasiveness of violence.   
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Map 2:  Homicides, Colombia:  2005 
 
Source:  Dinámica espacial de las muertes violentas en Colombia, pg. 35. 
 
The actual number of deaths noted in Map 2 does not provide sufficient information due to the 
varying population densities found across Colombia.  Map 3 offers more information by coding 
the map with reference to homicide rates.  Those areas not colored have homicide rates below 
the national average (41 per 100,000).  Red areas have homicide rates higher than the national 
average.  And dark red areas have homicide rates more than double the national average. 
1-10 
11-50 
51-100 
101- + 
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Map 3:  Colombian Homicide Rates, 2005 
 
Source:  Dinámica espacial de las muertes violentas en Colombia, pg. 35. 
 
Note that these figures do not include battlefield deaths from confrontations between the military 
and guerrillas, not does it include assassinations by paramilitaries groups, nor does it include 
deaths that take place in massacres.  
As the above suggests, violence in Colombia is (1) more common, (2) more widespread, and (3) 
more extensive than the drug-related violence in Mexico.  While the sense of vulnerability and 
insecurity might seem similar to observers, that experienced in Colombia is (and has been for 
decades) quantitatively and qualitatively different. 
 
 Socio-Economic and Political Conditions 
Another distinguishing factor between Mexico and Colombia are the differing socio-economic 
and political conditions in each country.  This is critical because of the another element to be 
examined later – the different actors engaged in violence in each country.   
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The UN Human Development Report provides information for a number of critical socio-
economic variables.  The objective of the Human Development Report is to assess the quality of 
life of people in different countries by measuring comparable indicators.  In all of the variables 
measured by the UN Human Development Report, Mexico performs better than Colombia.  (See 
Table 1).  Taken together, this suggests a very different context within which each state must 
fight against drug violence.  As explored in greater detail below, these socio-economic 
differences also influence which actors are engaged in violence and towards what goals. 
 
Table 1:  A Comparison of Socio-Economic Indicators for Mexico and Colombia 
Indicator Mexico Colombia 
Human Development Ranking 51 80 
GINI Index 
(measurement of income inequality; 
the higher the number, the worse 
inequality exists) 
46.1 58.6 
Share of income/consumption, 
richest 10% 
39.4% 46.9% 
Share of income/consumption, 
poorest 10% 
1.6% 0.7% 
Population living below national 
poverty line (%) 
17.6% 64% 
GDP per capita (PPP) 10,751 7,304 
Official unemployment rate 3.5% 11.8% 
          Data from UN Human Development Report 2007/2008 
The high rate of poverty and sizeable income inequality in both countries is noteworthy.  
However, from a comparative perspective, the situation in Colombia is worse than in Mexico.  I 
would argue that these socio-economic conditions influence drug production and trafficking; 
therefore, they are significant for the structuring of drug policy. 
Political conditions in Mexico and Colombia differ as well.  Freedom House ranks Colombia 
“partly free” while Mexico is considered “free”.  (Freedom House, 2008)  Indicators from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators suggest the political context in Colombia, like 
its socio-economic context, is worse than in Mexico.  (See Charts 1, 2, and 3) 
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Chart 1:  Voice and Accountability 
 
Source:  Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo (2008) 
 
Chart 2:  Political Stability 
 
Source:  Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo (2008) 
 
Chart 3:  Government Effectiveness 
 
Source:  Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo (2008) 
 
As in the case with socio-economic indicators, these political indicators suggest that conditions 
in Colombia are broadly worse than in Mexico.  And both the socio-economic and political 
conditions have given rise to a critical distinction between Mexico and Colombia:  the strength 
of non-actors that seek to achieve political aims outside the bounds of legal political activity. 
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 Perpetrators of and Motives for Violence 
I would argue that the conditions noted above give rise to the single most important difference 
between Mexico and Colombia-what actors engaged in drug production, trafficking, and why.  In 
the case of Colombia, the situation in the country includes not only the state and drug cartels but 
also paramilitary groups (such as the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia – known by its 
Spanish language acronym, AUC) and revolutionary groups (such as the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia – known by its Spanish language acronym, FARC).  Each non-state actor 
has some role in the drug trade.  But paramilitary groups and revolutionary groups have purposes 
beyond self-enrichment (in theory, at least).  These actors are drug-financed but politically 
motivated.  Revolutionary groups such as FARC and ELN are political forces that seek 
revolutionary change in Colombia; their roots lie in La Violencia and even earlier political 
movements in Colombia (see Kirk, 2003 and Livingstone, 2003, among others).  The 
paramilitary groups arose to protect landowners, the wealthy, and drug traffickers from the 
revolutionary groups.  Both sets of non-state actors pose a threat to the state by undermining 
what many consider to be the most basic attribute of a state:  monopoly of use of force.  Thus, 
the violence in Colombia is multifaceted:  (1) clashes between drug rivals for control and 
dominance; (2) clashes between the state and revolutionary forces as part of an on-going 
insurgency; (3) clashes between paramilitaries and revolutionary forces; and (4) acts of violence 
committed by paramilitary forces against civilian populations.  I would argue that it is this mix of 
drug-financed violence perpetuated by numerous actors that constitutes the essence of 
“Colombianization.” 
In contrast, the violence that has plagued Mexico in recent years stems directly from the drug 
trade.  The best known opponent of the state – the EZLN (known as the Zapatistas, or the 
Zapatista Army of National Liberation) have renounced the use of force.  The other commonly 
identified group, EPR (the Popular Revolutionary Army) is concentrated in Guerrero.  According 
to the Los Angeles Times, "the EPR is an 'army' probably consisting of fewer than 100 people, 
including several members of five extended families with roots in Oaxaca."  (September 20, 
2007)  It has not, since its emergence in the mid-1990s, developed into anything approaching 
either the FARC or the ELN.  The violence being experienced in Mexico focuses on two 
elements:  (1) intimidation of state actors in order to facilitate drug trafficking and (2) conflicts 
between drug traffickers in order to take control of an area and increase profits.  A long-term 
perspective reinforces this interpretation.  From the late 1980s on, every time a shift in cartel 
strength occurred (frequently due to the actions of the Mexican state against an organization), 
drug-related violence increased.  (Scherlen, 2008)  Compare the map below with Map 1:  drug 
violence in Mexico is taking place in cartel-dominated locations.   
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Map 4:  Mexican Drug Cartels and Their Areas of Operation 
 
The United States government recognizes the cartel-based source of Mexican violence and, more 
importantly, its link to the drug war.  As a report to Congress notes, “[t]he 2002 arrest of 
Benjamin Arellano Felix, head of the Tijuana cartel, and the 2003 arrest of Gulf cartel head Osiel 
Cárdenas, led to a realignment of Mexican cartels and increased turf wars” as remaining cartels 
sought to increase their prominence and market share within the United States  (Cook, 2007:  11) 
 
Drug production and drug trafficking are contributing factors to Colombian violence.  Arguably, 
the money associated with drugs has enhanced the capacity of revolutionary and paramilitary 
groups, thereby increasing the amount of violence.  Likewise, it has made the task of the 
government even more difficult.  In contrast, the violence in Mexico is wholly attributable to 
drugs.  Indeed, the drug war itself has accentuated the violence in Mexico.  The two cases are 
dissimilar; the United States should not advocate similar policy to both.  
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Conclusion:  The Long-Term Perspective 
 
The United States should not look to Colombia to shape the drug war in Mexico.  First, the 
conditions in each country are significantly different.  Second, it is arguable that Plan Colombia 
and subsequent “Andean Imitative” have not been very successful (see, for instance, the GAO 
Report issued October, 2008).  Clearly the security situation in Colombia has improved.  Plan 
Colombia assisted a weak state caught in the midst of a fight between revolutionaries and paramilitaries.  
However, drug production and trafficking continue.  Furthermore, Colombia is still a more 
violent country than Mexico.  Colombia can only be considered a success if (1) it is compared to 
its recent past; (2) the focus remains on violence, not drug production and trafficking; and, (3) if 
Colombia is not compared to other countries.  Unfortunately, analysts and policy makers typically 
perceive the “drug war” to be identical in these different countries.  Furthermore, the recent success of the 
state against paramilitary and revolutionary forces has been seen as success in the drug war.  And, given 
perceptions about the “Colombianization” of Mexico, this “success” in Colombia has resulted in calls for 
the implementation of the same policies in Mexico. 
Evidence from Mexico’s own past as well as the experiences of other countries suggest that 
Mexico will continue to suffer an upward spiral of violence as drug war is pursued vigorously.  
As it is conducted at present, the drug war has a supply-side emphasis:  eradication, extradition, 
and interdiction seek to lessen (and ultimately stop) the flow of drugs into the United States.  
However, without modifying the demand for drugs, the drug war creates perverse outcomes.  
Reduced supply with constant demand results in higher prices.  Higher prices create a greater 
incentive for drug production and trafficking (higher profits).  The arrest of a key figure opens 
the door for a new “kingpin”.  To emerge as a leader in the illicit trade one typically must 
eliminate rivals, thereby increasing violence.  Drug war tactics and strategy have caused the drug 
violence in Mexico.  If Calderon continues to follow the same path with US support, the violence 
will not abate.  However, since violence increases costs for cartels, smart traffickers will search 
for alternative routes and “peace negotiations” with rivals.  As was seen it Colombia with the 
demise of the Cali and Medellin cartels, in the wake of extreme turf wars often arise a new set of 
traffickers who are more “low key” and “businesslike”. 
A decrease in drug-related violence would be beneficial for Mexico.  The scenario described 
above, however, should not be confused with a “victory”  in the war on drugs.  The relatively 
improved security situation in Colombia has had no impact on the flow of drugs out of the 
country.  Indeed,  any long term assessment of the drug war leads to the same conclusion:  it is a 
failure.  President Nixon first declared the war on drugs in June, 1971.  President Ronald Reagan 
renewed federal efforts with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; President George H.W. Bush 
inaugurated a concerted policy with the formation of the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) and the appointment of a “Drug Czar.”  The evidence reveals that the enormous 
expenditures and countless deaths have not had a significant impact on drug use in the United 
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States.  (Robinson and Scherlen, 2007)  The US drug war policy has not achieved its objectives.  
US assistance to foreign countries has extracted tremendous costs without little to no gain.  A 
long-term view of price for cocaine shows that is cheaper now than when the ONDCP was 
founded.  Chart 4 starkly illustrates this. 
 
Chart 4:  Wholesale and Retail Price of Cocaine in the US, 1990-2007 
 
Source:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 
  
Mexico is in a precarious position.  Its long border with the United States makes it a natural 
target for drug traffickers seeking access to the United States.  The supply-side emphasis of the 
United States places pressure upon Mexico to target and combat drug cartels, thereby resulting in 
increasing violence (not to mention corruption).  However, as long as demand remains constant, 
drug trafficking cannot be eliminated.  The stage is set for a long, drawn out, vicious war that 
will end with the consolidation of power by one or more cartels and a continuation of the drug 
trade.  As in many policy areas, the future for Mexico is more in the hands of the United States 
than itself.   Attacking demand in the United States would fundamentally alter the dynamics of 
the drug war; this however, can only be implemented by the United States government. 
Will the US change its policy?  I would argue that how drug war policy is framed is critical.  As 
long as analysts, journalists, and government officials present the drug war in a “gain frame” 
(some success), politicians and public are likely to be risk adverse , and thus not supportive of 
changing policy.  Widely publicized pronouncements about “higher prices and lower purity” for 
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cocaine lend support to the idea that the tide is turning in the drug war.  Yet time and time again, 
these public announcements of success are followed by low-key reversals.
1
  The “gain frame” of 
the drug war results from a consistent use of short-term perspective as well as selective use of 
data to present findings in their most beneficial light. 
A long-term view of the drug war results in quite a different assessment.  The failure to achieve 
goals and mounting costs place the policy in a “loss frame.”  If this were more widely 
disseminated and publicized, policy change would be more likely:  politicians and public in the 
loss domain would be more risk acceptant and thus more open to change. 
Policy debate over US assistance to Mexico opens the door for policy change.  If observers and 
officials reject the “Colombianization” analogy and seek a more long-term assessment of the 
policies pursued to date, the frame by which we understand the drug war in Mexico would 
change.  Acceptance of the overwhelming failure of the drug war to achieve its goals would 
make discussion of policy alternatives more acceptable (less politically costly).  And, with that 
change would come an opportunity to fundamentally transform drug policy in the United States 
and Mexico into one that has a better change for success. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 For example, in a press conference in the fall of 2005, the Drug Czar announced a “dramatic” increase in cocaine 
prices and a decrease in cocaine purity that  were the “proud achievement of Plan Colombia and the U.S. counter-
drug strategy in the Andes.”  that were then more quietly shown to be an aberration 6 months later.  Similarly, the 
US trumpeted the decline in coca cultivation in Colombia only to quietly acknowledge that this “decline” was in 
areas that had been under cultivation in the past but did not include new areas of cultivation which, when included, 
increased the total number of hectares under cultivation from the past year.   
16 
 
 
Bibliography 
Astorga, Luis A. (1996) Mitologia del Narcotraficante en Mexico.  Mexico City, Mexico:  
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. 
“Battles won, a war still lost”  Economist, 2/12/2005, Vol. 374, Issue 8413 
Berejekian, Jeffrey (1997) “The Gains Debate:  Framing State Choice” The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 91, No0. 4, pp. 789-805. 
Boettcher III, William A. (2004) “The Prospects for Prospect Theory:  An Empirical Evaluation 
of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion” Political 
Psychology, Vol 25, No. 3, pp. 331-362. 
Carpenter, Ted Galen (2005) “Mexico is Becoming the Next Colombia” Foreign Policy Briefing 
No. 87, November 15, 2005. 
-------------------- (2003) Bad Neighbor Policy.  New York, NY:  Palgrave. 
Cook, Colleen (2007) “Mexico's Drug Cartels” CRS Report For Congress, October 16, 2007.  
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf 
Crandall, Russell (2002) Driven by Drugs:  US Policy Toward Colombia.  Boulder, CO:  Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 
Dermota, Ken (2000) “Snow Business:  Drugs and the Spirit of Capitalism” World Policy 
Journal, Winter 1999/2000 
Ellingwood, Ken (2008) “Extreme Drug Violence Grips Mexico Border City” Los Angeles 
Times, December 19, 2008. 
Freedom House (2008) Freedom in the World, 2008.  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008 
Holmes, Jennifer,  Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres (2006)  "The Illegal Drug Industry, 
Violence and the Colombian Economy: A Department Level Analysis" Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 104-118. 
Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses (2008) 2007 Forensis.  
http://www.medicinalegal.gov.co/index.php?option=com_wrapper&Itemid=323 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), “Map of Internal Displacement in Colombia, 
2008.”  UNHCR Refworld. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4821c920d.html 
17 
 
Jordan, David C. (1999) Drug Politics.  Norman, OK:  University of Oklahoma Press. 
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler (1991) “Anomalies:  The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 
(1), pp. 193-206. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo (2008) “Governance Matters VII: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 4654. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1148386 
Khong, Yuen Foong (1992) Analogies at War.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press. 
Kirk, Robin (2003) More Terrible Than Death.  New York, NY:  PublicAffairs. 
Lacey, Marc (2008) “Killings in Drug War in Mexico Double in 08” New York Times, 
December 8, 2008. 
Livingstone, Grace (2003) Inside Colombia:  Drugs, Democracy and War.  New Brunswick, NJ:  
Rutgers University Press. 
Lupsha, Peter (1981) “Drug Trafficking:  Mexico and Colombia in Comparative Perspective” 
Journal of International Affairs pgs. 95-115 
Marcella, Gabriel and Donald E. Schulz (1999) “War and Peach in Colombia” Washington 
Quarterly 
Mares, David R. (2006) Drug Wars and Coffeehouses:  The Political Economy of the 
International Drug Trade.  Washington D.C.:  CQ Press. 
McKinley, James C. (2005) “Mexico Says Drug Cartel Had Spy in President's Office” The New 
York Times, February 7, 2005. 
----------------------- (2007) ““Mexico's Latest War on Drug Gangs Is Off to a Rapid Start” The 
New York Times, Jan 27, 2007 
Meyer, Maureen (2007) “At A Crossroads:  Drug Trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State” 
Briefing Paper 13, Washington Office on Latin America & The Beckley Foundation 
Drug Policy Programme, November 2007. 
Nuñez, Joseph R. (2001) “Fighting The Hobbesian Trinity In Colombia:  A New Strategy For 
Peace”  Strategic Studies Institute Monograph 
18 
 
Observatorio de Derechos Humanos (2008)  Dinámica espacial de las muertes violentas en 
Colombia.  http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/observatorio_de_DDHH/publicaciones/ 
estu_tematicos/dinamica_espacial.pdf 
Pardo, Rafael (2000) “Colombia’s Two-Front War” Foreign Affairs July/August 2000 
Rensselaer W. Lee III and Francisco E. Thoumi (1999) “The Political-Criminal Nexus in 
Colombia” Trends in Organized Crime, Winter  
Richani, Nazih (1997) “The Political Economy of Violence:  The War-System in Colombia” 
Journal of Internamerican Studies and World Affairs 
Robinson, Linda (2000) “Where Angels Fear to Tread:  Colombia and Latin America’s Tier of 
Turmoil” World Policy Journal, Winter 1999/2000 
Robinson, Matt and Renee Scherlen (2007) Lies, Damned Lies and Drug War Statistics.  Albany 
NY:  SUNY Press. 
Scherlen, Renee (2008) “Bright Beginnings, Failed Finales:  The Sexenio Pattern of US 
Perceptions of Mexican Counter Narcotics Efforts” paper presented at the Annual 
Southern Political Science Association Meeting, New Orleans, LA, January, 2008. 
Shifter, Michael (2007) “Latin America’s Drug Problem” Current History, February 2007. 
--------------------- (1999) “Colombia on the Brink” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999 
Storrs, K. Larry and Nina M. Serafino (2001) “Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 
Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress 
Thompson, Ginger (2005) “Fox Says U.S. Shares Blame For Problems Along Border” The New 
York Times. September 5, 2005. 
Thoumi , Francisco E. (2002) “Illegal Drugs in Colombia: from illegal economic boom to social 
crisis” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, January 
2002. 
United Nations Development Programme (2008) Human Development Report 2007/2008.  New 
York, NY:  United Nations Publications.  http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-
2008/ 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2008) 2008 World Drug Report.  New York, NY:  
United Nations Publications.  http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-
2008.html 
19 
 
United States Government Accountability Office (2008) “Plan Colombia:  Drug Reduction Goals 
Were Not Fully Met, But Security Has Improved; US Agencies Need More Detailed 
Plans for Reducing Assistance”  Washington DC:  Government Printing Office. 
Van Dongen, Rachel (2003) “The Right Man” The New Republic, pgs. 12-13. 
Velez de Berliner, Maria (2007) “Mexico’s Colombianization and Threats to US Interests in 
Mexico” www.lat-intel.com accessed November 12, 2008. 
“War without end” Economist, 3/6/2004, Vol. 370, Issue 8365 
Walsh, John M. (2007) “Connecting the Dots:  ONDCP’s (Reluctant) Update on Cocaine Price 
and Purity”  A Report by the Drug Policy Program of the Washington Office on Latin 
America.  http://www.idpc.info/php-bin/documents/WOLA_RP_CocaPricesUSA_EN.pdf 
Watson, Cynthia A. (1990) “Political Violence in Colombia:  Another Argentina?” Third World 
Quarterly, pp. 25-39 
Youngers, Coletta A. and Eileen Rosin, eds. (2005) Drugs and Democracy in Latin America:  
The Impact of US Policy.  Boulder, CO:  Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
